Aum Shinrikyo’s Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Development Efforts by Nehorayoff, Andrea A et al.
Journal of Strategic
Security
Volume 9
Number 1 Volume 9, No. 1, Special
Issue Spring 2016: Designing Danger:
Complex Engineering by Violent Non-
State Actors
Article 5
Aum Shinrikyo’s Nuclear and
Chemical Weapons Development
Efforts
Andrea A. Nehorayoff
ABS Consulting, andrea.nehorayoff@gmail.com
Benjamin Ash
START Center, University of Maryland, bja.ash@gmail.com
Daniel S. Smith
START Center, University of Maryland, dsmith32@umd.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss
pp. 35-48
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nehorayoff, Andrea A.; Ash, Benjamin; and Smith, Daniel S.. "Aum
Shinrikyo’s Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Development Efforts."
Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 1 (2016) : 35-48.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.1.1510
Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/5
Aum Shinrikyo’s Nuclear and Chemical Weapons
Development Efforts
Author Biography
Andrea Nehorayoff currently works as a Risk Analyst at the American
Bureau of Shipping (ABS) Consulting. Prior to ABS, she served as a
Research Assistant with the National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), where her research
primarily focused on identifying radiological/nuclear threats and
analyzing gaps and vulnerabilities in the global nuclear detection
architecture. She received a M.S. in Justice, Law and Criminology from
American University’s School of Public Affairs and a B.A. in Political
Science from the George Washington University.
Benjamin Ash is currently a researcher at the National Consortium for
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), with a focus
on CBRN terrorism. Prior to START, he interned at the Partnership for
Global Security as a Biological Proliferation Prevention Research
Assistant, reporting on biosecurity issues and the Cooperative Threat
Reduction initiative. He holds an M.S. in Biodefense from George Mason
University's School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs and a
B.A. in Political Science from Christopher Newport University.
Daniel Smith is a research associate at the National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), where he works
with colleagues on projects related to radiological and nuclear threats to
national security. His research interests include insurgencies, civil wars,
terrorism, and political violence, writ large. He received a B.A. and M.A.
in Comparative Politics from the University of Virginia.
Abstract
This article details the terrorist activities of the Japanese cult, Aum
Shinrikyo, from the perspective of its complex engineering efforts aimed
at producing nuclear and chemical weapons. The experience of this
millenarian organization illustrates that even violent non-state actors
with considerable wealth and resources at their disposal face numerous
obstacles to realizing their destructive aspirations. Specifically, Aum’s
attempts at complex engineering were stymied by a combination of
unchecked fantastical thinking, self-imposed ideological constraints, and
a capricious leadership. The chapter highlights each of these
mechanisms, as well as the specific ways in which they constrained the
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decision-making process and the implementation of the complex
engineering tasks associated with their unconventional weapons
development.
Disclaimer
Editor’s Note: This article forms part of a series of related case studies
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for a full explanation and comparative analysis of the cases.
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Introduction 
Aum Shinrikyo, an apocalyptic-millenarian cult headquartered in Japan, 
made headlines in March 1995 by conducting one of the most notorious 
terrorist attacks using an unconventional agent,1 during which five Aum 
members released sarin nerve agent in five subway lines in Tokyo, killing 
twelve, injuring several hundred, and forcing around six thousand people to 
seek medical attention.2  Prior to the attack, the group attempted at least ten 
chemical agent and ten biological agent attacks between 1990 and 1995.3  
While Aum Shinrikyo actually engaged in the development of biological and 
chemical weapons, the group actively sought a nuclear weapons program.  
Indeed, in the early 1990s, Aum Shinrikyo moved to acquire nuclear materials 
and construct nuclear weapons.4  When the construction of nuclear weapons 
proved unattainable, Aum members abandoned their nuclear aspirations and 
focused on their chemical and biological programs.5  This article focuses on 
the evolution of Aum Shinrikyo, from its inception as a failed political entity 
to its eventual place in history as one of the most notorious terrorist groups, 
with specific attention paid to its complex engineering efforts, especially the 
chemical and nuclear weapons programs. 
 
Decision  
Aum Shinrikyo’s efforts to develop chemical and nuclear weapons are owed 
largely to the morbid curiosity, penchant for fantastical thinking, and 
apocalyptic ideology espoused by its leadership, while its financial resources 
enabled the group to pursue the requisite complex engineering required.6  
Secondary factors included the group’s expanding size and influence, 
protected status as a religious organization (preventing intervention by 
                                                        
1 Adam Dolnick, “Aum Shinrikyo’s Path to Innovation,” in Maria Rasmussen and 
Mohamed Hafez, Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect: Preconditions, 
Causes, and Predictive Indicators, Report ASCO 2010-019 (Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency [Advanced Systems and Concepts Office], 2010): 17, 126. 
2 Ibid., 126.; Holly Fletcher, “Aum Shinrikyo,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 19, 
2012, available at: http://www.cfr.org/japan/aum-shinrikyo/p9238. 
3 David Kaplan, “Aum Shinrikyo,” in Jonathan Tucker’s Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist 
Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 207. 
4 Sara Daly, John Parachini, and William Rosenau, "Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the 
Kinshasa Reactor," RAND Corporation, 2005, 12, available at: 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_
DB458.pdf. 
5 Ibid., 8. 
6 Rasmussen, Maria and Mohamed Hafez, Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass 
Effect: Preconditions, Causes, and Predictive Indicators, Report ASCO 2010-019, 
(Defense Threat Reduction Agency [Advanced Systems and Concepts Office], 2010): 18. 
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Japanese authorities), and a desire to eliminate perceived enemies.7  Aum 
Shinrikyo is considered by some to be the first violent non-state actor (VNSA) 
with “the means, capabilities, intentions and finances to develop and deploy a 
sophisticated weapon of mass destruction.”8  
 
Aum members adhered to a millenarian ideology espoused by their leader, 
Chizuo Matsumoto, who later took the name Shoko Asahara.  Asahara 
espoused a belief that salvation can only be brought about through “final 
conflict and eradicating the enemy,” in which Aum would play a pivotal role.9  
The group’s stated ideology was a syncretic blend of Buddhism and several 
other religions, with millenarian tropes that focused on persistent nuclear 
threats to Japan and the nation’s psychological devastation from the atomic 
bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.10  Specifically, he prophesied the 
coming of a nuclear war that would result in Armageddon, where Aum 
Shinrikyo’s members would constitute the sole survivors.11 
 
Following its poor showing in Japan’s 1990 parliamentary elections, Aum 
Shinrikyo’s agenda shifted from doomsday survival to doomsday initiation, 
with the goal of bringing about the apocalypse.12  Asahara accused the 
Japanese government of deliberately altering election results, and sought to 
overthrow the Japanese government (and other perceived enemies, including 
the United States) using weapons of mass destruction (WMD).13  Asahara 
demonstrated a fetish-like affinity for unconventional weapons with high 
destructive potential.  The extent of his obsession was manifest in the fact that 
he wrote odes about the chemical agent sarin.14  Furthermore, according to a 
                                                        
7 Kaplan, “Aum Shinrikyo,” in Jonathan Tucker’s Toxic Terror, 208. 
8 James Forest, "Framework for Analyzing the Future Threat of WMD Terorism," Journal 
of Strategic Security 5: 55 (2012), available at: 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1193&context=jss.  
9 Sara, Daly, John Parachini and William Rosenau, "Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the 
Kinshasa Reactor," RAND Corporation, 2005, 5, available at: 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_
DB458.pdf. 
10 Ibid., 8.  
11 Ibid., 6. 
12 Philipp C. Bleek, "Revisiting Aum Shinrikyo: New Insights into the Most Extensive 
Non-State Biological Weapons Program to Date," Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011, 
available at: http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/revisiting-aum-shinrikyo-new-
insights-most-extensive-non-state-biological-weapons-program-date-1/. 
13 Anthony T. Tu, “Aum Shinrikyo’s Chemical and Biological Weapons,” Archives of 
Toxicology, Kinetics and Xenobiotic Metabolism 7: 3 (Autumn 1999): 49. 
14 Gary Ackerman, “’More Bang for the Buck’: Examining the Determinants of Terrorist 
Adoption of New Weapons Technologies” (PhD thesis, King’s College London, 2014), 12-
13, available at: 
https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/32901277/2014_Ackerman_Gary_0715371_ethes
is.pdf; Gary Ackerman, “Motivations for Engaging in Nuclear Terrorism,” FfP Threat 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 9, No. 1
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/5
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2005 RAND report, “Asahara’s obsession with nuclear weapons formed the 
foundation for all of his actions related to these weapons.”15  Not only did he 
try to develop his own nuclear weapons, he sought to provoke a U.S. nuclear 
attack on Japan in order to “precipitate Armageddon,” and he went about 
doing so by targeting a U.S. military base, rival organizations, and the general 
public16 
 
Asahara’s charisma inspired unctuous behavior on the part of members, 
resulting in his uncontested monopoly on decision-making.17  He ordered 
Aum members to carry out the 1995 attack on the Tokyo subway system.18  He 
refused to tolerate dissension or opposition to his arcane agenda and often 
killed, or attempted to kill, those who opposed him.19  Asahara’s uninhibited 
leadership style lent itself to hasty decision-making that involved minimal 
contemplation on his part.  Shoko Egawa, a journalist who studied the group 
since its inception, claimed that Asahara was prone towards making 
“impulsive” and “shortsighted” decisions.20  
 
Compliance with Asahara’s decisions was facilitated via several mechanisms, 
each of which suppressed active opposition by individuals in the group.  
Sycophantic members believed that supporting his decisions, regardless of 
their logical or ethical qualities, was a means to acquire greater status within 
the organization.21  Egawa noted that while many cult members harbored 
doubts about the probity of their actions, they acted under the belief that 
Asahara’s vision transcended their own worldly concerns.22  According to 
                                                        
Convergence Publications, Fund for Peace (FfP), Jan 25, 2008, 6, available at: 
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/46247/ipublicationdocument_singled
ocument/11ef4937-b842-435e-98cd-
4c651cecc508/en/Motivations+for+Engaging+in+Nuclear+Terrorism.pdf; Rasmussen 
and Hafez, Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, 18. 
15Daly, Parachini and Rosenau, "Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor;” 
Dolnik, Adam, Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, tactics, and global 
trends, (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2007), 159. 
16 Milton Leitenberg, Responses to Aum-related inquiries via email. 10 October 2015. 
17Daly, Parachini and Rosenau, "Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor."  
18 “Japan Cult Member Sentenced to Death,” CBS News, July 28, 2000, available at: 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/japan-cult-member-sentenced-to-death/; Lebra, Takie 
Sugiyama, The Japanese Self in Cultural Logic (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii 
Press, 2004), 49, available at: https://books.google.com/books?isbn=0824828402   
19Rasmussen and Hafez, Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, 17. 
20Yumi Wijers-Hasegawa, “Aum Shinrikyo plagued by guru’s whims, journalist says,” The 
Japan Times, 2003, available at: 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2003/04/25/national/aum-shinrikyo-plagued-by-
gurus-whims-journalist-says/#.VhgkdPlVhBc. 
21 Reader, Ian, Religious Violence in Contemporary Japan: The Case of Aum Shinrikyo 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000), 150. 
22 Yumi Wijers-Hasegawa, “Aum Shinrikyo plagued by guru’s whims, journalist says.”  
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prominent Aum member Toshiyasu Ouchi, where reticence towards certain 
activities lingered, individual members expected one another to vocalize 
objections.23  In this way, each member was able to displace any moral burden 
associated with unsavory actions, and shift it to others.  Both of these 
dynamics effectively curtailed the willingness of Aum members to vocalize 
opposition, and limited their role in the decision-making process.  In addition 
to the aforementioned mechanisms, physical coercion and threats of violence 
were frequently used to cow opposition to Asahara’s decisions.  
 
Asahara’s monopoly on decision-making authority did not preclude input by 
the high-ranking members of his inner circle, especially those heading 
“ministries” that oversaw the organization’s activities.24  While the ultimate 
decision to pursue a particular weapon fell to Asahara, he exchanged ideas on 
weapons and strategies with the heads of Aum’s biological, chemical, and 
nuclear programs, often in the context of informal conversation.25  Changes in 
the demographic and social backgrounds of the Aum leadership played a 
crucial role in determining the types of ideas featured in the group’s decision-
making process.  According to a report developed by the Center for a New 
American Security, the shift from a predominantly female leadership in the 
late 1980s to the predominantly male leadership of the early 90s entailed 
movement towards the development of unconventional weapons, in line with 
the technological fetishism of the new cohort.26  These members sought to 
curry favor with Asahara by promoting ideas that comported with his 
technological fetishism and favorability towards schemes inspired by science 
fiction.27  These intra-group dynamics illustrate how members of the 
leadership aside from Asahara were able to influence the decision-making 
process by framing particular engineering tasks in ways that appealed to 
Asahara, such as pursuing technology on the basis that it was perceived as 
“advanced.”  The decision to engage in the “in-house” production of weapons 
of mass destruction came only after the group faced numerous setbacks in its 
attempts to acquire such weapons abroad.  These setbacks, and the ultimate 
                                                        
23 Richard Danzig, Marc Sageman, Terrance Leighton, Lloyd Hough, Hidemi Yuki, Rui 
Kotani and Zachary M. Hosford, “Aum Shinrikyo: Insights Into How Terrorists Develop 
Biological and Chemical Weapons (2nd Edition),” Center for a New American Security, 
2012, 14, available at: 
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AumShinrikyo_SecondEdit
ion_English.pdf . 
24 Gavin Cameron, “Multi-track Microproliferation: Lessons from Aum Shinrikyo and Al 
Qaida,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 22 (1999): 283, available at: 
doi:10.1080/105761099265658. 
25 Marc Sageman, Telephone Interview. October 27, 2015. 
26Danzig, et al., “Aum Shinrikyo.”  
27 Marc Sageman, Telephone Interview. October 27, 2015.  
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 9, No. 1
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shift to intra-group development, will be addressed in detail within the 
context of a broader discussion concerning the group’s weapons programs. 
 
In support of his apocalyptic cause, Asahara expressed a willingness to engage 
in new complex engineering tasks that presented a high risk of failure.28  The 
group’s ability to tolerate greater amounts of risk can be at least partially 
attributed to its vast financial resources—possessing more than 1 billion USD 
in assets at its peak—which provided it with the leeway to pursue a new 
avenue to achieve its engineering goals even when the previous avenue did 
not pan out or initial attempts failed.  Indeed, the group was able to attempt 
at least 20 attacks with biological and chemical agents prior to 1995.29  A trial 
and error approach was thus far more feasible for Aum than groups with 
more limited resources.  Its high risk tolerance was also the result of its 
obsession with “futuristic technologies” such as WMDs,30 which it was 
prepared to pursue despite the daunting technical obstacles their 
development presented.  Furthermore, the group risked discovery of its illicit 
operations by state authorities by making large-scale purchases and 
circumventing basic national regulations and protocols.  For example, 
Hayakawa Kiyohide, Aum’s construction minister, and Yoshihiro Inoue, its 
intelligence minister, oversaw and coordinated the ill-conceived purchase of a 
500-acre sheep farm in Western Australia to mine uranium and test chemical 
weapons.31  During the early phases of the operation, several sect members 
were penalized for taking mining equipment onto a plane bound for Australia, 
which indicates the relaxed attitude members held in regard to avoiding 
entanglements with authorities.32  
 
As the group neared a viable and effective chemical weapon, Asahara engaged 
in less risky behavior. In 1994, Aum members were implicated in a sarin 
incident in Matsumoto City. Afterwards, Asahara, fearing a police raid on his 
compounds, ordered Aum members to cease the production of sarin and to 
destroy all evidence of the substance.33 The organization also sought to 
                                                        
28Rasmussen and Hafez, Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, 17.; Bleek, 
"Revisiting Aum Shinrikyo."  
29Rasmussen and Hafez, Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, 18. 
30 Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 123. 
31Danzig, et al., “Aum Shinrikyo;” Daly, Parachini and Rosenau, "Aum Shinrikyo;” 
Hoffman, Inside Terrorism; Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, "Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on 
the Aum Shinrikyo," (1995), Federation of American Scientists, available at: 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1995_rpt/aum/index.html.  
32 Daly, Parachini and Rosenau, "Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor."  
33 Anthony T. Tu, “Aum Shinrikyo’s Chemical and Biological Weapons,” Archives of 
Toxicology, Kinetics and Xenobiotic Metabolism 7: 3 (Autumn 1999): 51-52. 
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protect its members from the dangerous agents that they were deploying, 
which indicates an interest in reducing risk. 
 
Implementation 
Aum Shinrikyo engaged in a prolonged effort to achieve its complex 
engineering goals.  Its biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons programs 
began in earnest in 1990 and continued through 1995, culminating in the 
group’s notorious Tokyo Subway attack.  The progression of Aum’s weapons 
programs can be conceptualized as three chronologically distinct periods.  
The first period is characterized by the group’s loss in the 1990 Japanese 
parliamentary elections and its subsequent decision to pursue chemical and 
biological weapons programs.  The second follows the group’s short-lived 
attempt to obtain nuclear weapons, followed by the resumption of its 
chemical and biological weapons programs.  In the final phase, Aum 
continued its two most successful weapons programs, chemical and 
biological, and finally achieved the lethal results it sought. 
 
The first demonstrated attempt to acquire weapons occurred in 1988, when 
Aum Shinrikyo attempted to buy chemical munitions from what it believed to 
be a U.S.-based weapons supplier, but was later revealed to be a front for the 
U.S. Customs Service.34  Had the supplier been genuine, Aum would have 
attained more than 250 tons of sarin.35  While this attempt was unsuccessful, 
the group would later turn to its own scientists to develop chemical weapons, 
with lethal results. 
 
In 1990, Aum Shinrikyo’s defeat in Japan’s parliamentary elections 
humiliated the group and, already harboring millenarian beliefs, Asahara 
predicted than the apocalypse would engulf Japan.36  The group subsequently 
initiated its complex weapons programs in order to destabilize the Japanese 
government.37  These programs boasted a hierarchical structure containing 
various ministries headed by trusted members, each of who managed his or 
her own unit and reported directly to Asahara.38  However, while members 
                                                        
34  Amy E. Smithson, “Rethinking the Lessons of Tokyo,” in Ataxia: The Chemical and 
Biological Terrorism Threat and the US Response (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson 
Center, 2000), 81. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 74. 
37 Tu, “Aum Shinrikyo’s Chemical and Biological Weapons,” 49. 
38 Cameron, “Multi-track Microproliferation.” 
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shared a mutual fascination with weapons of mass destruction, few actually 
engaged in developing advanced technological capabilities.39 
 
Seiichi Endo’s Ministry of Health and Masami Tsuchiya’s Chemical Arms Unit 
primarily managed Aum Shinrikyo’s biological weapons program,40 which 
began in the spring of 1990 with the initial production of botulism toxin.41  It 
was in 1990 that the group perpetrated its boldest ‘apocalyptic’ campaign42 
dispersing botulism toxin in Tokyo that went largely unnoticed as the strain 
was ineffectual, resulting in no casualties.43  What set this series of attacks 
apart from the rest of Aum’s attacks was its wide array of targets, including 
U.S. Naval bases, the Narita International Airport, the Japanese Kokkai 
(National Assembly), and the Imperial Palace.44  Furthermore, Asahara 
instructed Aum members to flee from Japan’s mainland to Ishigaki island.45 
 
The birth of the chemical weapons program followed shortly thereafter, 
beginning in the summer and focusing on chlorine and VX gases.46  The initial 
production phase was short-lived, though, as the October apprehension of 
three leaders for “fraudulent land purchases” temporarily halted its biological 
and chemical weapons programs.47 
 
Aum Shinrikyo’s WMD pursuits would reemerge in 1992 when its efforts to 
acquire nuclear weapons capabilities began in earnest through the group’s 
international networks and activities in Russia and the United States, through 
which the group intended to procure information and materials.48  During 
visits to Russia, Aum leaders consulted Russian scientists in order to obtain 
laser and nuclear technologies.  The group was also believed by some to have 
shown interest in purchasing fissile materials from Russia.49  Through its 
network, Aum Shinrikyo successfully recruited over 300 scientists and 
engineers—including employees at the Kurchatov Institute, the premier 
                                                        
39 Marc Sageman, Telephone Interview. October 27, 2015.; Milton Leitenberg, Responses 
to Aum-related inquiries via email. 10 October 2015. 
40 Cameron, “Multi-track Microproliferation;” Milton Leitenberg, Responses to Aum-
related inquiries via emai. 10 October 2015. 
41 Kaplan, “Aum Shinrikyo,” in Jonathan Tucker’s Toxic Terror, 213. 
42 March Sageman, telephone interview. October 28. 2015. 
43 Danzig, et al., “Aum Shinrikyo,” 18, 19.  
44 Monterey Institute of International Studies, “Chronology of Aum Shinrikyo’s CBW 
Activities,” 2001. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Danzig, Sageman, Leighton, Hough, Yuki, Kotani and Hosford, “Aum Shinrikyo,” 18. 
47 Ibid.  
48 Daly, Parachini and Rosenau, "Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor."  
49 Busch, Nathan E., No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation 
(University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 11. 
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nuclear facility in Russia—who were either attracted to the apocalyptic 
ideology or lured with financial incentives.50  Aum Shinrikyo’s Russian 
contacts enabled group members to access black market materials and 
hardware.51  At this time, Shoko Asahara met Nikolay Basov, a Nobel Prize 
winner for research on laser technology focusing on the “practical 
applications for the laser, particularly how it can be used for thermonuclear 
fusion, which would allow controlled generation of nuclear power.”52  
Unconfirmed reports have even claimed that one of Aum Shinrikyo’s senior 
leaders, Hayakawa Kiyohide, may have purchased a nuclear warhead for 15 
million USD through the Russian advanced weapons market,53  although this 
is highly unlikely. 
 
When attempts to purchase a nuclear weapon floundered, the group shifted 
its efforts to building its own nuclear weapon. Kiyohide Hayakawa’s Ministry 
of Construction heavily influenced Aum Shinrikyo’s nuclear and chemical 
weapons programs, and was responsible for producing the sarin used in the 
1995 attack on the Tokyo subway system.54  He also exercised purchasing 
authority primarily on behalf of Aum Shinrikyo’s nuclear program; and Hideo 
Murai’s Ministry of Science and Technology was vital for producing 
weapons.55 Hayakawa personally traveled to Australia to help the 
organization acquire a 500,000-acre sheep farm called Banjawarn Station to 
serve as a front company for mining uranium and testing chemical weapons.56 
 
In 1993, Aum Shinrikyo continued its biological weapons program, 
maintained its research into acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities, and 
                                                        
50 Daly, Parachini and Rosenau, "Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor;” 
Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, "Global 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo," 
(1995), Federation of American Scientists, available at: 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1995_rpt/aum/index.html. 
51 Daly, Parachini and Rosenau, "Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor."  
52 Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, "Global 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo;” 
Daly, Parachini and Rosenau, "Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor;” 
Olga Prodan, “Prominent Russians: Nikolay Basov,” RussiaPedia, available at: 
http://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-russians/science-and-technology/nikolay-
basov/. 
53 Daly, Parachini and Rosenau, "Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor."  
54 “Japan Cult Member Sentenced to Death;” Lebra, The Japanese Self in Cultural Logic.  
55 Cameron, “Multi-track Microproliferation;” Milton Leitenberg, Responses to Aum-
related inquiries via email. 10 October 2015. 
56 Richelson, Jeffrey, Defusing Armageddon: Inside NEST, America’s Secret Nuclear 
Bomb Squad (W. W. Norton & Company, 2009), 124, available at: 
https://books.google.com/books?isbn=0393065154; Daly, Parachini and Rosenau, "Aum 
Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor."  
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resumed its chemical weapons program.57  In addition to internal support, 
Aum Shinrikyo made efforts to incorporate technical expertise from outside 
the group in its attempts to acquire and build chemical, biological, nuclear, 
seismological, plasma, and laser weapons.58  Group members utilized the 
Internet to gather information on nuclear facilities in Russia, Ukraine, China, 
and South Korea. 59  The group also established a network consisting of 
scientists and front companies. Across its transnational network, Aum 
Shinrikyo consisted of more than 40,000 members, with approximately 
10,000 in Japan, 30,000 in Russia, and several dozen in the United States.60 
Furthermore, the group utilized front companies, such as Clarity Investments, 
Maha Posya, Bell Emoch, and Hasegawa Chemicals, in order to obtain 
weapons, laboratory and industrial equipment, chemical ingredients, and 
precursor chemicals.61  This gave it the opportunity to leverage vast human 
resources and access multiple networks.   
 
Group members believed that the enlisted technical experts would enable 
them to acquire chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons; however, none of 
the recruits possessed expertise in nuclear physics.62  The majority of Aum 
members with scientific backgrounds were alienated individuals with 
substandard levels of professional accomplishment.63  A 2005 RAND report 
implies that these scientists’ expertise in medicine, biochemistry, biology, and 
genetic engineering and lack of knowledge about nuclear weapons design was 
the primary reason for the group’s shift towards chemical and biological 
weapons.64  Furthermore, the group’s indoctrination methods yielded 
inefficiency and paranoia due to sleep deprivation and narcotics, which 
interfered with its biological and perhaps other weapons programs.65 
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Despite its desire to acquire advanced technological capabilities with the 
expertise of numerous scientists and engineers, Aum Shinrikyo faced 
numerous obstacles to obtaining its unconventional arsenal, eventually 
resulting in the abandonment of its nuclear weapons program.  One source 
describes Aum Shinrikyo’s experience as “a story of evolution.”66  When 
initially pursuing a nuclear weapon, Aum considered its Russian network to 
be the most likely to succeed, though ultimately this avenue did not yield 
positive results.67  Not willing to abandon its nuclear aspirations, the group 
attempted to lay the foundation for its own nuclear program in Australia, yet 
failed again.68  In May of 1993, a large explosion occurred near the farm in 
Australia that remains unexplained, but may be attributed to Aum’s nuclear 
program.69  If, indeed, the explosion was related to its nuclear program, a 
possible explanation for the subsequent abandonment of the farm is that Aum 
may have realized that nuclear technologies fell outside of their capabilities, 
or at least were unattainable because Asahara’s 1995 timeframe for nuclear 
Armageddon proved too short for group members to successfully construct a 
nuclear weapon.  Even if unrelated to its nuclear research, Aum Shinrikyo 
may have reasonably left the farm in order to avoid interdiction by law 
enforcement authorities.  As a result, the group more effectively utilized its 
resources by focusing on chemical attacks, which had shown the most 
promise to date.70  
 
The farm in Australia may have also served as a testing ground for Aum’s 
chemical weapons program.  When Australian authorities examined the farm 
once Aum had abandoned it, they discovered the remains of 29 sheep and 
Japanese-language documentation that led the authorities to believe the 
reason for the deaths of the livestock was for unidentified experimentation.71  
While the tests to identify sarin were not necessarily conclusive, as a 
byproduct of sarin breaking down in the environment is also related to the 
natural decomposition of the sheep,72 the timeline does suggest that Aum 
Shinrikyo had used the sheep to confirm the lethality of their chemical 
weapon. 
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In the fall of 1993, Aum was able to generate 20 grams of sarin at the 
Krishitigalva Prefab.73  Possibly due to the efficacy of the agent, Asahara 
ordered increased production, requiring a new facility.  In response, the cult 
constructed the $30 million USD74 Satyan 7 facility which was equipped with 
three laboratories, a computer control center, and five reactors, all of which 
was made from corrosion-resistant Hastelloy, ideal for the production of 
chemical weapons.75  Once completed, Aum’s sarin production increased 
significantly. From its opening in October to November, 600g of sarin were 
produced and December would see a total of 3kg of sarin produced at the 90 
percent purity level.76  However, the limited chemistry background of 
Kazuyoshi Takagawa led to sub-optimal results, with Takagawa employing 
only three of the five steps used by his predecessor, Tsuchiya, to produce 
sarin.77 
 
Furthermore, group members resumed their targeted attacks in Japan, 
utilizing botulinum toxin, bacillus anthracis, and sarin, though all were 
unsuccessful.78  The year 1994 saw a series of attacks against individuals that 
Aum’s leadership considered a threat, including the incident at Matsumoto, 
which targeted judges involved in a legal case concerning Aum.  The group 
released sarin and, while the judges survived the attack, eight people in total 
died with an additional 200 injured.79  Possibly influenced by the efficacy of 
the chemical attacks, Aum members sold the Australia property in 1994 and 
focused on chemical and biological weapons.80 
 
One year later, Aum Shinrikyo’s active pursuit of chemical and biological 
weapons came to an end.  In March, the group perpetrated its most infamous 
attack when five members released sarin on five subway lines in Tokyo.81  
Aum members dispersed the sarin throughout the subways using a method 
that proved ineffective—they punctured holes in plastic bags filled with 
sarin.82  In order to ensure their own safety and avoid the effects of sarin, 
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members carried atropine and pyridine-2-aldoxime-methylchloride as a 
precaution.83  Some sources even indicate that Aum Shinrikyo intentionally 
produced a less pure version of sarin for the attack in order to elude detection 
during its development, and possibly to ensure the safety of the group 
members carrying out the attack.84  However, Seiichi Endo provided Tsuchiya 
with only four days to prepare sarin for the attack, and ultimately made use of 
an incorrect organic base during production.85  The attack still failed to yield 
Asahara’s intended results either due to the low concentration of sarin or the 
unconventional dispersal method.  Aum members later carried out an attack 
in May, as they unsuccessfully attempted to disperse hydrogen cyanide during 
the Children’s Day holiday.86  Ultimately, on December 15, the Japanese 
Prime Minister ordered the disbandment of Aum and seized all of its assets.87  
 
The aforementioned timeline yields two key observations regarding Aum 
Shinrikyo’s pursuit of complex technologies.  First, the organization’s 
fascination with technology inspired members to pursue multiple, novel 
weapons programs, largely as a means of appeasing Asahara and achieving 
higher status within the cult.88  While the group’s chemical and biological 
weapons programs were the most well-known, it had shown interest in a 
myriad of technologies, including nuclear, seismological, plasma, and laser 
weapons as well.89  Despite a substantial war chest, all of these initiatives 
ended in failure save for the chemical weapons program, and even its 
successes were few.90 
 
Analysis 
Aum Shinrikyo took up complex engineering tasks concerning nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons due to its apocalyptic ideology and the Aum 
leadership’s obsession with high-tech and unconventional weapons.91  
Asahara, in particular, expressed a techno-fetishist affinity towards WMDs, 
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which led the group to pursue more advanced technological weapons.92  
Ranking Aum members generally shared this obsession, resulting in a 
leadership with numerous ideas for achieving apocalyptic ends, but without 
efficacious plans or practical knowledge for bringing those ideas to fruition.93  
As a cult that grew quickly and incorporated over 300 scientists and 
engineers, Aum Shinrikyo developed a false sense of confidence in the coming 
of doomsday and in the group’s ability to embark on a WMD development 
program.94  
 
The group did prove adept at responding to setbacks and adjusting its focus to 
maximize the likelihood of committing a successful attack.  While Aum 
Shinrikyo failed to acquire a nuclear weapon, it successfully perpetrated 
chemical weapon attacks owing to its self-imposed short timeframe for action 
and protected status as a religious organization.95  Because of the difficulties 
associated with acquiring nuclear materials and constructing a nuclear 
weapon, Aum Shinrikyo shifted focus to its chemical weapons development 
program; chemical agents also proved easier to acquire and assemble.96  One 
of the key factors that enabled Aum Shinrikyo to continue its activities for 
several years and acquire innovative technology is that the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government granted the group official religious corporation 
status in 1989, providing them with various privileges that include tax breaks 
and de facto immunity from oversight and prosecution.97  
 
Despite its aspirations, financial clout, and relative security from state 
meddling, Aum Shinrikyo was never able to develop its desired weapons of 
mass destruction.98  Its chemical weapons program proved partially 
successful to the extent that the 1995 Tokyo subway attacks caused mass 
injuries, but the ideal of mass fatalities lay out of reach.  While the group 
ultimately failed to approximate its ideal outcomes, the foregoing discussion 
has stressed the extent to which failure may have been contingent on the 
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inability of Aum’s “experts” to adequately perform the complex engineering 
tasks needed to attain organizational goals with the allotted time and 
available knowledge base.  As noted, the group produced impure sarin, which 
some sources have claimed was unintentional, and due to the short timeframe 
with which they had to construct a weapon.99  Another manifestation of basic 
technical shortcomings was Tsuchiya’s use of an incorrect organic base during 
the rush to prepare sarin for the Tokyo subway attacks.  Furthermore, Aum 
had difficulty acquiring an effective dispersal system in preparation for those 
attacks, thereby resorting to puncturing holes in plastic bags to ensure the 
delivery of sarin.100  Reliance on individuals with little practical experience 
was also a major factor in the numerous technical shortcomings, as evident in 
Kazuyoshi Takagawa’s failure to replicate the sarin manufacturing procedure 
used by Tsuchiya.  Whether these failures owed more to eschatological 
timeframes or lack of practical experience with the relevant complex 
engineering tasks, the group’s limited success highlights the difficulties 
associated with bringing apocalyptic goals to fruition.  
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